Virtual Gold Farming by Šmolík, Filip
Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
BACHELOR THESIS
Virtual Gold Farming
Academic Year 2011/2012 Author Filip Šmolík
Declaration of Authorship
The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed
resources and literature and that this thesis was not used to obtain another academic degree.
The author grants to Charles University permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of
this thesis document in whole or in part.
Prague, 30. července 2012
Signature
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful especially to PhDr.Ing Jiří Skuhrovec (for access to World of Wacraft,
provision of data and invaluable comments) and my family (for material and moral support).
Bibliografický záznam
Šmolík, Filip. Virtual Gold Farming. Praha 2012. 85 s. Bakalářská práce (bc.) Univerzita
Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut ekonomických studií.
Vedoucí diplomové práce PhDr.Ing. Jiří Skuhrovec
Keywords Gold Farming, Real Money Trade, Virtual Economies, World of Warcraft
Klíčová slova Gold Farming, Real Money Trade, Virtuální Ekonomiky, World of War-
craft
Délka 108 tisíc znaků
Abstract
At the end of 20th century new branch of computer games was developed – MMORPGs
(Massive Multi Player Online Role Playing Games). This thesis deals with new phenomenon
connected with them – RMT(Real Money Trade), which consists of selling virtual (in-game)
currencies for real currencies (mainly US dollar nad euro). Demand side of this business is
constituted by players of MMORPGs, supply side consists of so-called gold farmers. Thesis
itself is focused on key variable of RMT – exchange rate between real a virtual currency. With
help of theoretical model it is demonstrated that the exchange rate affects player’s decisions
related with RMT. Then it is shown, which variables have impact on exchange rate itself
and there is described one of the possible sources of disturbances – operator of MMORPG.
Operator’s updating policy is analyzed and in empirical part some updates are chosen and it
is demonstrated that they affect exchange rate in accordance with previous established theory.
Abstrakt
Na konci 20. století vznikla nová větev počítačových her - MMORPGs (Massive Multi Player
Online Role Playing Games). Tato práce se zabývá novým fenoménem, který je s nimi spo-
jen - RMT(Real Money Trade), což je prodej virtuálních (tedy vnitroherních) měn za měny
reálné (zejména dolar a euro). Strana poptávky v tomto odvětví je tvořena hráči zmíněných
her, strana nabídky se skládá z tzv. gold farmerů. Práce samotná se zabývá klíčovou pro-
měnnou, která ovlivňuje RMT – směnným kurzem mezi reálnou a virtuální měnou. S pomocí
teoretického modelu je demonstrováno, že tento směnný kurz ovlivňuje hráčova rozhodnutí
související s RMT. Dále je ukázáno, které proměnné ovlivňují směnný kurz. V následující
kapitole je popsán jeden z možných zdrojů změn tohoto kurzu – provozovatel hry. Právě jeho
politika aktualizování hry je analyzována v poslední kapitole – teoreticky i empiricky - na ně-
kolika vybraných příkladech. U těchto případů bylo zjištěno, že aktualizace ovlivňují směnný
kurzu v souladu s teorií.
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Preface
Before we start to analyze the issues, which we described in abstract, we have to mention (and
maybe apologize for) two problems connected with the study of this branch of economics. If
we compare it with other branches, we realize that it’s relatively young discipline, where only
small amount of academical papers was published. Works written by Castronova (2002 and
2005), Lehdonvirta (2005 and 2009), Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist (2011) and especially Heeks
(2008 and 2010) contain large amount of valuable informations about virtual economies and
related issues, but they don’t employ rigorous economic methods. Only such paper (which
we found) was written by Skuhrovec (2009).
Previous paragraph implies that researcher, who wants to study virtual economies, suffers
from lack of academical literature. Hence we have to employ non-academical sources of knowl-
edge, in this case sources from various webpages, which are dedicated to playing online games.
Second problem is that there is large amount of special terms, which are related to MMORPGs.
We don’t want to confuse reader with them, thus we try to minimize their amount in the the-
sis itself. For better orientation small glossary of MMORPG’s terms is presented in Appendix.
In this thesis we state examples (and empirical study in chapter 5) from MMORPG World of




This thesis is dedicated to analysis of relatively new form of a market, which was created at
the end of 20th century. This business was very specific - objects of its interest were items,
which de facto didn’t physically exist in real world. Its popularity rose and gradually this
market became economic phenomenon as well as social phenomenon. In the thesis we will
examine particular components of the market - supply side, demand side as well as attitude of
other interest groups involved in it and focus on one important variable, which affects them all.
First chapter is introductory chapter. Its aim is to explain some terms, which will be used later
and introduce our reader into issues of virtual economies. We will describe Massive Multi-
player Online Role Playing Games (acronym MMORPGs will be used), virtual worlds, virtual
economies as well as Real Money Trade (RMT), gold farming and other terms important for
the thesis.
1.1 MMORPGs and their worlds
MMORPGs
MMORPGs are branch of computer games, which enables players to meet each other in vir-
tual space and communicate in real time. MMORPGs allow player to create a character,
which represents him. This character explores virtual world, kills monsters and obtains vir-
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tual items. All MMORPGs are provided by operators 1. MMORPGs are a phenomenon of the
last two decades. They capitalized on fast spread of Internet, which brought new possibilities
to game developers. The most important one of them was possibility of interaction between
people in real time within one game. It led to genesis of online playing. MMORPGs repre-
sented its more sophisticated branch. The result was that they became popular. The rapid
development MMORPG genre underwent in the second half of the 90ths. At this time, impor-
tant and influential titles in this genre were published - the first generation of MMORPG’s.
Among them were for example Lineage, Nexus, Meridian 59, and especially the ”Big Three”
- Ultima Online, Everquest and Asheron’s Call. Beginning of 21th century brought further
development of the popularity of the whole MMORPG genre. Their supreme position in the
computer games market has confirmed the second generation of these games - Dark Age of
Camelot, Eve Online, Anarchy Online and others. In 2004 new game was launched by Blizzard
Entertainment - World of Warcraft. The game quickly became the most popular MMORPG
of all time and still remained (Jinman 2007). Currently (first half of 2012) it has got about
10.2 million of the paying players2 (i.e. players paying monthly fee for having access to the
game - currently about $ 15 3) plus unknown numbers of players on semi-illegal servers.
Virtual worlds
Previous definition states that every MMORPG contains its own unique virtual space. This
space is called virtual world and it´s crucial for the thesis, because the phenomena, which are
described in it, take place there. Bell’s definition (2008) includes five main properties. The
first one is that virtual world is synchronous, in other words activities of the player take place
simultaneously in real time – as was already written. Secondly, it has to be persistent. It
means that virtual world is in progress even if player is not in the game. Thirdly, there has
to be a network of people, whose actions have influence on the world. Fourthly, in virtual
world a player is represented by his virtual alter-ego (which is sometimes called Avatar). At
last there has to be a storage of data through a computer. The last property is important,
1Operator of MMORPG is a company, which provides the game to the players – takes care about function-




because it allows virtual world to exist on a large-scale (contrary to for example so-called pen
and paper games, which meet some of the previous signs, but they are only for small number
of the players).
1.2 Virtual economies
Properties of virtual economies
When we defined virtual world, we stated that actions of the players affect the world and
other players too. Thus there are conditions for a formation of economic relationship between
them and a resulting birth of virtual economy. If we read Samuelson & Nordhaus (2007),
we realize that economy has to include production, consumption and scarcity. Hence we are
allowed to say that virtual economy is included in virtual world if three phenomena mentioned
above take place there.
Production in the context of virtual economy means creating4 (or collecting) virtual items
(Lehtiniemi 2008). Players use their virtual ability to create virtual items or kill NPC5 mon-
sters and loot their items. Then they sell those items to NPC vendors or via various in-game
mechanisms directly to other players. The players buy and then use (consume) the items.
Way of using depends on item’s characteristics. The term items includes both goods that
are quickly consumed (such as potions), as well as durable items (swords, armor, bows, ...).
If we mention durable items, we have to add that usually there is a large amount of services,
which are related to them (repairing, upgrading,...) and which co-creates in-game economy.
In-game items have five main attributes (Blazer 2006). First of them is rivalry - objects are at
some time held by one person or small group of people. Second attribute is interconnectivity.
It means that possession of an item may be affected by the ownership and use of other items.
Third of them is permanence - object remains in the possession of its owner, even when it is
not in use. Fourth attribute (and for the thesis the most important as we will write later ) is
that there exist secondary markets, thus virtual items can be made, traded, bought and sold.
4It means that player is able to create the items and then sell it, see Example of virtual economy
5NPC is an acronym for non-player character, i.e. in-game character controlled by artificial intelligence.
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The last one is added value. In other words, owner of a virtual object can appreciate it.
If we look at the previous five properties, we can see that interconnectivity, existence of sec-
ondary markets as well as possibility of item’s appretiation are related to already mentioned
production and consumption. Permanence (third attribute) means that there is no form of
uncertainty except cases given by game’s rules (unlike from real world, where property can be
stolen, when we aren’t at home). Finally, first attribute – rivalry – is very closely linked with
third phenomena from our definition and concurrently main reason why economists should
examine these virtual economies – scarcity, by definition the limited quantity of a resource,
factor of production or output. 6 Economics assumes that people want to consume more and
more and they cannot be completely satisfied. But consumers are restricted by the fact that
resources aren’t unlimited, thus people have to optimize their consumption. The same can
be seen in virtual worlds too. There are the items, which are common and they are cheap.
Better items are harder to find and thus more expensive to buy. Carli (2007) gives an example
from Ultima Online, where only rare colour of a horse multiplies its price. Player’s desire for
consumption of those items collides with his budget constraint. Similarly as in the real world
this constraint is affected by the player’s ability and time spent on the earning money. If we
play arbitrary MMORPG, we can see that quality of in-game equipment (weapons, armors,
mounts,..) differs from player to player. This is sign of scarcity. Thus all of the three ini-
tially mentioned phenomena take place in virtual economies – production, consumption and
scarcity.
Example of virtual economy - World of Warcraft
Now we give an example of a virtual world. We chose World of Warcraft, because it is the
most popular MMORPGs. 7 We focus on three previously mentioned phenomena. Before
we describe this virtual economy, we have to mention that in World of Warcraft players are
divided into two opposite parties – the Alliance and the Horde. Generally we can say8 that
these parties are economically separated.
6definition from Rutherford D. Routledge Dictionary of Economics,3rd ed., Routledge,2005
7www.mmochart/Chart7.html
8there is one exception, see http://wow.joystiq.com/tag/neutral-auction-house/
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Let’s begin with production. In World of Warcraft player is allowed to practice craft, which
leads to the creation of virtual objects as well as he can obtains unique items through various
types of in-game professions. Examples of first type of professions (production) are black-
smithing, tailoring, or leatherworking. Second type (gathering) includes herbalism, mining
or skinning9. Another sort of professions includes abilities, which appreciate other items (we
can state enchanting of items for example). Player is developing all these skills through their
frequent usage. If we recall Lehtiniemi (2008), we realize that collecting items is part of in-
game economy too. In World of Warcraft there is a possibility to collect them from killed
NPC characters as well as from other sources.
World of Warcraft allows players to trade with NPC merchants 10 as well as between them-
selves11. Main currency, which is involved in in-game transactions, is gold coins, which consist
of silver and copper coins12. Aside form gold, there are alternative currencies (for example
Honor points, 13 Valor points,..), which player can obtain by various in-game activities. They
can be used for buying special items, but it isn’t possible to sell them to other player. In-game
vendors are universial buyers (they buy almost all items in arbitrary amount). Contrary to
this fact they are specialized sellers. Lots of vendors provide some services - for example
blacksmith repairs damaged items. NPC merchant has got infinite amount of money, so there
is no problem for players to sell arbitrary amount of the items14.
Trade of players with other players (PvP trade) takes the form of either a barter trade
exchange (i.e. primitive exchange of items without an intermediary), or a more sophisticated
form of using the mechanism of Auction House (AH). When using barter trade player goes to
marketplace to meet potential trade partners and with help of ingame communication (public








which are objects of interest of more players. It takes the form of an auction. Players see the
price set by seller, start to bid and the object is sold to the player who offered the most (or to
the player, who pays so-called buyout price). Existence of these houses implies that players
are willing to compete with other players to obtain certain items. If we look at auction prices
set by the players, we will see that they are several times higher than price set by game15. It
means that there has to some form of scarcity, because the players are willing to pay signifi-
cantly more than the item costs.
Consumption of the items follows what we wrote earlier. There are durable items as well
as one-time consumable ones or creatures, which can player use for transport.16 .
Conclusion
In previous text we described one of many virtual economies. With previous knowledge we can
(following Castronova (2005)) state six main reasons, why modern economics should examine
these economies
1. The consumption of virtual goods - as in the real world, players buy, sell and
consume goods.
2. Improving the skills of virtual character through time invested into the game. We
should be interested in this matter because of the fact that virtual character’s skills
influence its economic value.
3. Production of virtual objects by the player. As we wrote earlier, production is
one of the signs of every economy. On the other hands it carries dangers for the stability
of the virtual world. In the case of poorly set game system, economic relationship may
cause the collapse of the whole world.
4. Competition between players. In the virtual world a large number of players are
competing for limited resources. All players start with the same (or relatively similar)
resources, their further development therefore depends on their abilities.
15Based on experiences with collected data from these houses.
16http://www.wowwiki.com/Item
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5. Decision making under uncertainty - the players don’t know in advance the con-
sequences of their decisions.
6. Parallel to the real world - in the world of online gaming there are economic phenom-
ena that have taken place in the real world too. Related to this the opinion of researchers
dealing with this issue (Lehdonvirta, Castronova) is that in the virtual world there are
basically the same economic laws as in the real one and those can be used as laboratory
for economic experiments.
All of facts mentioned above are good reasons to study virtual economies. But there is one
additional (and probably the most important) reason to focus on virtual worlds. On previous
pages we implicitly assumed that these economies are closed, in other words independent on
other economies, real one included. But already at the end of 20th century new phenomenon
became popular – blending of real economy and virtual economy. It meant the origin of RMT.
1.3 RMT and gold farming
RMT
The term RMT abbreviates Real Money Trade, which characterizes its nature well. This
activity is about an exchange of virtual assets (the term itself will be explained soon) for real
currency (such as USD or EUR). As we wrote above, RMT became popular in the end of the
20th century, although the first sign can be traced before 1990 (Heeks 2008). It is designated
for those players, who have got more real money than time, patience or abilities. There are
two types of RMT market (Lehtiniemi 2008). The first one - primary market - is provided
by operator of the game, who sells virtual assets to the players. Most of online games don’t
include primary market (Lehtiniemi 2008). On secondary market there are economic rela-
tionships solely between the players of these games. We can give a simple example of how
secondary RMT works. Consider a virtual world, where there are two players. The first one
has got large amount of virtual wealth, whereas second player is poor in the virtual world, but
he has got larger amount of real world money. With existence of RMT they can both improve
their life. The first of them sells excessive virtual assets and receives real money. The second
player sacrifices certain amount of real currency, but improves his virtual character. As we
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wrote before, both counterparts improved their positions. But there is another party, which
does not have anything from this exchange - operator. Moreover, it can be potentially harmed
from it. The reason why will be described in chapter 4. For this moment it’s important to
note that majority of the operators are against RMT in their products. And they are able to
fight it through legal mean.
Each player is bounded by contract with the game’s operator - the EULA (End User
Licensed Agreement). This agreement restricts the use of player’s gaming license. In EULA
those operators, who are against RMT, explicitly declare that buying and selling virtual as-
sets for real currency is illegal. This is the main argument of operators - player confirmed
his agreement with EULA, thus also with non-participating on RMT. On the other hand,
some people were sentenced because of theft of virtual property 17. It would imply that the
players have got rights to capitalize on it. Let’s look on example - Blizzard’s EULA 18. There
is explicitly written that player is not allowed to:
1. buy or sell for ”real” money or exchange gold, weapons, armor, or any other virtual
items that may be used in World of Warcraft outside the World of Warcraft platform;
2. let any third person (except for a minor for whom you opened the Account) play on
your Account including, but not limited to, using so-called ”power levelling services”,
i.e. paying a third person for playing on your Account; or play on the Account of a third
person including, but not limited to, providing so-called ”power levelling services”;
Hence in case of World of Warcraft - from legal point of view - player is not allowed to
freely dispose with his in-game wealth, nor he can freely manipulate with his account19.
Now we have to explain the term virtual assets itself. It covers (according Lehdonvirta 2009)
17Example from Runescape: http://news.mmosite.com/content/2009-12-01/20091201235706854.shtml
18http://eu.blizzard.com/en-gb/company/legal/wow_eula.html, Blizzard is operator of World of Warcraft.
19Account in MMORPG (in this case WoW) contains all player’s virtual characters and thus all his virtual
property. Player pays subscription fee per account, probably most of ordinary players have only one account.
On the other hand, there can be as much virtual characters as player wants on the account
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virtual items (we wrote about them earlier – durable and non-durable ones), in-game estates,
in-game playable characters and last but not least - virtual currency itself20.
Gold farming
Demand side of RMT consists of players with more real assets than virtual ones (or patience).
Now we focus on supply side of the business. It primarily consists of the players, who don’t
play for joy from the game, but only for purpose of collecting virtual currency and its sub-
sequent trading for real currency.21 These players are called gold farmers and they often
work in larger groups as gold farming company. In chapter 3 we will explain the reasons
why as well as we describe this activity more detailed. The activity itself is nothing new -
origins are dated back to 1987, when the first transaction of this kind was established. (Heeks
2008). In the 90ths, it mirrored the rise of MMORPGs and 1997 was crucial for it, because
the already mentioned Ultima Online was released and RMT concentrated on it (Heeks 2008).
Although the number of gold farmers cannot be accurately calculated22, the authors spe-
cializing in this field agree that the sales volume of gold farmers is permanently increasing
(Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist 2011). According Heeks (2008) greater demand for gold farming
is closely related with improved access to the Internet and cheaper online games. If we
look at gold farming business, we realize that this activity consists of two stages – acquiring
virtual assets in the first stage and selling it in the second stage. Price, which consumers
(players) pay for obtaining virtual assets, is dependent on the exchange rate between real
and virtual money. The exchange rate can be seen on so-called exchange servers – web-pages,
where this exchange is negotiated (for example www.wowgoldeur.com, www.bestwowgold.com,
www.make-wowgold.com, www.swagvault.com,…).23 In the thesis we will show that this vari-
able is important for all counterparts.
20In next chapters we will use virtual currency rather than virtual asset.
21We use wilfully primarily, because in our later analysis we assume that exist players, who are sellers in
RMT, but they want to enjoy game too.
22it is implied by semi-illegal nature of this activity, no official data are availabe
23Problem with our exchange rate is that there are lots of exchange servers and their exchange rates are not
same on exchange servers.
13
Structure of the thesis
In this introductory chapter we described and explained main terms related to the topic of
the thesis and we will operate with them in other chapters. The thesis itself will focus on the
last of terms stated in previous text – exchange rate between virtual and real currencies.
Chapter 2 will focus on demand side of RMT - the players of MMORPGs. Through
the microeconomic model we will show how change in exchange rate affects player’s decisions
concerned with playing and using RMT.
Chapter 3 is about gold farming companies – supply side of RMT. We will discuss their
revenues and costs and show how the exchange rate is affected. In the end hypothesis that
operator’s actions influence this exchange rate will be stated
Chapter 4 is about struggles between operators and gold farmers. We discuss why op-
erators fight RMT in their games and try to explain why they don’t provide it on their own
plus we list methods of fighting RMT.
In chapter 5 we will try to prove that the hypothesis from chapter 3 is correct. It will
be done by the tools of econometrics - panel data instruments.
In one sentence – we will show the importance of the exchange rate , explain one of the
possible sources of its changes and then we will try to prove this hypothesis correct.
14
Chapter 2
Players and RMT: motivation and
decision-making
Second chapter of the thesis has got two main goals. First of them is that it should describe
motivation, which has got players for playing MMORPGs and eventually participating on
RMT. Then – before economic analysis itself – paradigm homo oeconomicus will be discussed
as well as we examine the meaning of utility and consumption in the case of MMORPG player.
Last part will be dedicated to decision-making of a player, namely his choice to participate
or not to participate on RMT as well as his allocation (time and money) decisions will be
discussed. It will be shown that important factor, which affects the decision itself, is the value
of exchange rate between real and virtual currency
2.1 Motivation: psychological approach
Before we start to write about motivation, we have to mention one important fact. According
to Yee’s (2006) study based on his Daedalus database it’s necessary to abandon prejudices
about the players of MMORPGS – that they are only young male students. The opposite
fact is true – spectrum of the players was widely diversified, only 25 % of Yee’s respondents
were teenagers plus there was an increasing amount of female players.
There are lots of studies, which are dedicated to motivation of MMORPG players, for ex-
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ample already mentioned Yee (2006), Griffiths, Davies & Chappell (2004), Cole & Griffiths
(2007) and Hsu, Wen & Wu (2009). From the oldest study we can mention Bartle (1996). All
of these studies have got similar results. They state that main reason why the players spend
time in MMORPGs is because of the joy from the game. On the other hand this joy can be
reached by various activities. In this thesis we will use Bartle’s classification of motivation.
Bartle (1996) distinguishes four main types of players. The first of them is the Achiever,
whose aim is to achieve the highest number of in-game goals and thus surpass others. These
players are natural candidates for the users of RMT because of their need to be the best (or
at least better than majority of other players,which naturally results in economic need for
high-quality goods, equipment etc.). Explorer is the second type of the player according to
Bartle. He wants to explore as much of the game’s possibilities and mechanisms as possible.
Third type is so-called Killer, whose motivation is fighting and killing other players. It’s good
to note that in majority of modern MMORPGs there are special areas, where Killers can re-
alize themselves and generally we can say that the possibility of involuntary fighting between
players is strongly reduced. The last type is called the Socializer, who is derived from the
social aspect of MMORPG. These people stress on social dimension of game – interaction be-
tween players, clustering into organized groups of the players (these groups are usually called
guilds). In recent studies we can find another type of players, which is not in Bartle’s study.
It is Role-player (Cole & Griffiths 2007), who identifies himself with his virtual character and
play his virtual role – speak and acts in compliance with his in-game characteristics (gender,
race, class,…). For the role-playing in all form is typical escape from reality (Bowman 2010).
If we look at the previous types, we can assume that primary candidates on users of RMT
are Achievers and then Killers, both because of similar reasons - they have to be better than
others.
Another possible view on motivation of the players is through Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
applied on virtual world. Maslow’s pyramid is a concept well-known from psychology. It
presumes that human needs have got hierarchical nature and need from higher level cannot
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be satisfied until lower level is satisfied 1. We wrote earlier that some players (especially
role-players) project themselves into their virtual characters, thus it is possible to apply the
pyramid on virtual world. Now let’s focus on particular floors of Maslow’s pyramid. We can
skip physiological needs (only in special case when virtual character (avatar) has to eat and
drink) and then there is the need of safety. If we apply it on MMORPG, then player has
got the need to protect his virtual character against excessive dying2. Another three levels
are the need of socialization, the need of success and the need of self-realization. We can see
that the need of becoming apparent is included in human’s nature. Link with RMT is fourth
and fifth level of Maslow’s pyramid, because RMT can help with obtaining additional funds
of virtual assets and thus it can bring success and self-realization. This theory implies that
in some phase of the game some role-players can use RMT to satisfy their needs.
If we summarize previous section with respect to RMT, we have to write that the most
probable users of RMT are Achievers, Killers and Role-players. The first and second men-
tioned ones because of their competitive nature, the third ones because of their identification
with in-game characters.
Economic modeling of player’s behavior – homo oeconomicus?
Before we introduce our model, which describes player’s behavior, we have to mention one
important problem, which is related to this concept. On previous pages we described player’s
motivation concerned with playing (and potentially with gold farming) and we were able
to see the diversity. But now we will use microeconomic tools, which have got very strict
assumptions. They assume that analyzed player of MMORPG is homo oeconomicus. It
means that he is rational – he knows his preferences, searches for information and he arranges
all possible alternatives and chooses the best of them. Moreover, he maximizes his utility
through consumption - virtual as well as real. It’s a question whether this concept isn’t in
1Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and personality. New York: Harper and Row., 2008, applied on MMORPG
in bachelor thesis: MMORPG: phenomenon of computer games, M. Pros, MUNI, 2008
2It’s good to note that in MMORPGs death of virtual character is common, but unpleasant - usually there
is some penalty(Runescape - part of player’s items is lost, World of Warcraft - in-game character is vulnerable
for some time, etc.)
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opposition against previous findings. Hence we rather state immediately at the beginning
of our analysis that in our model player will use his virtual consumption according to his
typology:
1. Achiever - to be better than others.
2. Explorer - to explore virtual world.
3. Socializer - to socialize with other players.
4. Killer - similarly to achiever.
5. Role-player – for maximal identification with his virtual characters.
In the next model we will state that increase of virtual consumption increases player’s
utility too. Let’s state an example. We consider a Killer, which buys better virtual sword,
shield and armor. Then he becomes stronger and can kill stronger players. Hence his utility
increases.
At last we make a conclusion: our player is a homo oeconomicus, because he is (or should be)
rational and makes optimization. But there is some joy from playing itself, which is difficult
to categorize (as well as the fact that player can be addicted on MMORPG). Hence if we
apply homo oeconomicus on ordinary player, our results will be weaker. The different case is
gold farmer. He plays only for profit, thus homo oeconomicus should describe him well.
2.2 Allocation model
Now we will analyze how the exchange rate affects time, which player spends in MMORPG
as well as amount of money, which he spends for the purpose of RMT. We will use upgraded
model for optimization of consumptions in two periods. Let’s assume for simplicity that player
is dividing his time only between working and playing. In the first period player works in
real world and earns real money. Part of this money consumes and part of them ”saves” for
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increase of virtual consumption. Let central equation of this model be in following form3
U = u(W + w · l − s) + f(s · EX + (L− l) · Pr)− v(l)
In this model u and f are utility functions for real (respective virtual) consumption (u′() >
0, u′′() < 0, same for f), W abbreviates initial wealth, l is amount of labor, which is spent
with real work, s denotes saving of real money for game’s purpose (for the beginning of our
analysis we presume that W + w · l > s > 0), EX is exchange rate between real and virtual
money (for example how much gold player obtains for one dollar) and Pr denotes virtual
productivity of player. First term of the equation is utility from real consumption, second one
is utility from virtual consumption and third one is harm from working (v′() > 0, v′′() > 0).
This harm is independent on other variables and represents straight disutility from labor. At
last, L is the total amount of time, which our player has got available. It is increasing in
time, which is spent with labor and convex - harm increases in increasing way. Our goal
is to find how l and s (only variables, which can be affected by the player) change with an
increase or a decrease of interest rate. It can be made with help of implicit function theorem.4









= w · u′(∗)− Pr · f ′(△)− v′(l) = 0





































3Original idea is taken from https://webspace.utexas.edu/sry93/Webpage/ImplicitFunctions.pdf, for the
purpose of the thesis original model is significantly changed.
4see Appendix
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We are not interested in W,w and Pr - let’s assume they are fixed, thus dW = 0 as well as
























Now we see system of two equations, which can be solved by Cramer’s rule5.
If we want to know how change of exchange rate affects labor’s decision, we have to solve



























= u′′(∗) + EX2 · f ′′(△) < 0
∂F
∂EX
= EX · s · f ′′(△) + f ′(△)?0
∂F
∂l
= −w · u′′(∗)− EX · Pr · f ′′(△) > 0
∂G
∂s
= −w · u′′(∗)− EX · Pr · f ′′(△) > 0
∂G
∂EX
= −Pr · s · f ′′(△) > 0
∂G
∂l
= w2 · u′′(∗) + Pr2 · f ′′(△)− v′′(l) < 0
5see Appendix
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If we look at values of entire elements, which we computed earlier, plus making some numerical














Neither nominator nor denominator are always higher or lower than zero. On the other hand
we are able to use simple fact that we are trying to solve this problem in maximum of the
function. Hence according to second order necessary conditions theorem7 we can say that
matrix in denominator is negative semidefinite. Now we are able to use Silvester’s theorem,
which implies that determinant of 2x2 symmetric negative semidefinite matrix is higher than
zero8. Hence our denominator is higher than zero too. But problem with nominator remains.
In other words, we are not able to say generally if increase of exchange rate leads to increase
or decrease of (L - l). It depends on individual utility function of a player. But we can say










or in other form
EX · w · u′′ · f ′′ + w · u′′ · f ′′ + EX · Pr · f ′ · f ′′ = Pr · s · u′′ · f ′′
exchange rate between real and virtual currency affects allocation of time in real
and virtual worlds. Similar situation is with saving. We are not able to say generally
6Hajkova V., Johanis M., John O., Kalenda O., Zeleny M., Matematika, Matfyzpress, 2011
7Hajkova V., Johanis M., John O., Kalenda O., Zeleny M., Matematika, Matfyzpress, 2011, see Appendix
8Only condition is symmetry of matrix and (−1) · ∂F
∂s
> 0, see Appendix
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how the exchange rate affects saving, but we can say that except one case there is a
relationship between them. We deduced these two results and now we try to generalize
them. In the beginning of our analysis we stated that W + w · l > s > 0. But this condition
determined attitude of our player toward RMT and it is too restrictive. Hence we analyze all
possible states of s separately.
1. If s > 0, then player is able to save part of his real-world income (and sacrifice his
real-world consumption) to boost his virtual consumption, but he is constrained by his
real wealth (no possibility of borrowing). Hence he is a passive user (buyer) of RMT
and he only buys virtual assets. Let’s denote his total utility Up.
2. If we say that s = 0, then player does not use benefits of RMT and thus he is not
sensitive on change in exchange rate (special case mentioned above comes to pass). He
is a non-user of RMT. Let’s denote his total utility Un.
3. Finally, if −(L − l) · Pr < EX · s < 0, then player acts in opposite way and boosts
his real consumption instead of virtual one - for every EX · s units of virtual currency
which he sacrifices in virtual world he obtains s units of real currency in real world. He
is an active user of RMT and similarly to passive user he is constrained by his income,
but now by virtual one, which is (L − l) · Pr. Let’s denote his total utility Ua. In
the case of an active RMT user we know that ∂F∂EX = EX · s · f ′′(△) + f ′(△) > 0 and
∂G
∂EX = −Pr ·s ·f
′′(△) < 0. But not even in this case we are able to generally determine
effect of exchange rate on labor decision (see dldEX ).
If we use optimization and find optimal s, then we can determine type of the player. Generally,
we can say that the total utility of the player is given by the equation
U total = max{Up, Un, Ua}
This model is not perfect, because for the purpose of simpler analysis we ignored additional
costs, which stem from negative attitude of other players - moral costs (C), which will be
discussed later. If we wished to add these costs, we would modify original equation in a
following way
y =
 u(W + w · l − s) + f(s · EX + (1− l) · Pr)− v(l) if s = 0u(W + w · l − s) + f(s · EX + (1− l) · Pr)− v(l)− C1−n otherwise
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In this equation n denotes the share of other players, which are against RMT. New term
in second equation is very important. While in a previous model non-users of RMT were
reduced to one case from interval
(
−(L− l) · PrEX ,W + w · l
)
, which implies that their amount
was reduced close to zero, the term C1−n causes that majority of MMORPG players doesn’t
participate on RMT (this fact will be implied by model in chapter 4).
At last there is special type of a player - gold farmer himself. He sells virtual assets for
real money - in other words he boosts his real consumption. This attribute is similar to active
RMT user, but there is one big difference between these of types of the players - gold farmer’s
workplace (where ordinary players spend time for labor) is in virtual world. We propose








Let’s compare gold farmer’s utility function with previous ones. Main difference is that gold
farmer does not have virtual utility function9. His consumption decision is given by his virtual
productivity, exchange rate and time, which is spent with gold farming. And there is another
difference between gold farmer and other types of the players - gold farmer faces disutility
from playing MMORPG (v(l)), but he bears no moral cost caused by ordinary player, because
he play only for money, not for joy from the game itself. If
U total = max{Up, Un, Ua, Ug} = Ug
then our player becomes gold farmer.
At the end of this analysis let’s summarize our theoretical results.
1. We found that (except for one situation) the exchange rate affects amount of time, which
players spend in the game.
2. Moreover, the exchange rate may affects saving of the players.
3. Neither in the first nor second case are we able to generally show which effect it has got.
It depends on individual utility function.
9We assume that he consumes only amount of virtual goods necessary to run gold farming
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4. Amount of saving (s) determines whether player is a passive user, an active user or a
non-user of RMT
5. The exchange rate affects player’s decision to become gold farmer.
Beyond C
Now we look what is hidden beyond the variable C. which we denoted as moral costs in
previous sections. In this case the term moral cost means that players, who use benefit of
real money trade, is put into ostracism of other players, who don’t use RMT. Players hate
the RMT itself too. First of all according to them, it spoils the game. While without RMT
ingame success depends solely on the player’s skill and perseverance, in the moment of onset
of an exchange between real and virtual world, the players begin to mirror social differences
from the outside world (Lehdonvirta 2010) and the game loses one of its main characteristics -
escape from reality. Well equipped virtual character becomes a positional good which trumps
other players - Lehdonvirta (2005) claims that Veblen effect takes place. This phenomenon,
named after the American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen, is reflected by the fact
that consumers are buying more expensive goods in order to rank themselves with help of
their consumption to a certain social group. Applied to the problem of RMT: player is trying
to maximize his position in social hierarchy with help of their virtual characters. Therefore
he tries to stand out above the rest with character’s level, equipment or abilites. If some
players fail or they are too slow, they try to use real money to earn this status. Grundy(2008)
documents that there is in-game pressure on some players to be successful and they can
reach this success only via RMT. From this perspective, it seems that in the whole system
of MMORPGs there is a rooted demand for RMT and thus good initial conditions for gold
farming. This behaviour, however, causes that players hate RMT users as well as gold farmers.
2.3 Gold farmer’s decision
Now we will extend previous model and apply it on developing countries (we will explain later
why). Assume a worker, who has got following two options:
1. he can work in virtual sector (gold farming industry). In the previous chapter we
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have written that according to Heeks (2008) gold farmers tend to join into companies.
Reasons why will be discussed in next chapter. If our worker accepts a job in gold
farming company, he earns wage wv. Let’s assume that his productivity is Prv.
2. he can work in real sector (the rest), then he earns wage wr. Let’s assume that his
productivity is Prr.
Assume that his utility function is similar as in the previous model:
U r = u(wr(Prr) · l)− vr(l)











if he works in gold farming industry. At first we assume that initial wealth W is zero, because
our worker is poor. Let’s describe this utility function. Unlike the previous model, his wage
is a function of his productivity (and the exchange rate in case of gold farming industry)10.
Let this function be increasing in w. Again, vi(l) with i = v, r denotes disutility from work
in particular industry. Our worker chooses his work according to following function
U = max{Ur, Uv}
Now we analyze both possibilities.
In case of real sector we can assume that his productivity is proxy variable for worker’s
abilities, qualification and education. If we consider a poor worker, it’s probable that his
education isn’t good. If he is unqualified, his productivity and following wage will be low.
Second term in our equation denotes disutility from work. Conditions for unskilled labor
force in developing countries are hard. The workplaces, where workers suffers from bad labor
enviroment, are called sweatshops. Hence we can assume that his disutility from work is high.
10Why this potential gold farmer differs form a gold farmer in the previous model? In the previous model
we implicitly assumed that player has got an access to a computer, copy of a MMORPG, internet connection.
If we consider poor worker from developing country, we assume he joins gold farming company and receives
wage.
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Now we focus on working in gold farming industry. In this case we presume that productiv-
ity is amount of virtual assets, which the worker can collect. Heeks (2008) wrote that the
workers in gold farming industry are paid based on their results. It is compatible with our
model. Moreover, Heeks (2008) states that wage paid in gold farming company is higher than
minimal wage in developing countries, althrough it is low from Europian point of view. Now
we look - as in previous case - on disutility from work in gold farming industry. It’s probable
that sitting in front of a computer is easier work than mining (especially if we consider rep-
utation of mines, for example in China11) or working in textile industry or Apple factory12.
In the previous model we had so-called moral costs in our equation. Then we stated that a
gold farmer doesn’t face them, because his only motive is profit. If we look at situation of
unskilled poor worker in China, we can assume that facing hate of MMORPG’s players is his
last worry. On the other hand if the exchange rate increases (thus virtual currency becomes
cheaper), then the worker receives lower wage.
From our previous text it’s probable that Ur < Uv for unskilled labor force in (at least
in some of ) developing countries. We can guess that in developed world is opposite situ-
ation (because of social state, labor protection, ….). For this reason we cannot be suprised
that majority of gold farmers are from the developing country - namely from China. Heeks
(2008) states that about 80 % of gold farmers are from this country. Hence majority of gold
farming companies operates there. And that’s the reason why we considered a worker from a






Gold Farming - company, costs and
exchange rate
3.1 Gold farming company - overview
In chapter 1 we explained the term gold farming and described history of gold farming indus-
try. In chapter 2 we showed worker’s decision to be part of gold farming company. In this
chapter we briefly describe the structure of a gold farming company and then we will focus
on its revenues and costs. With help of theoretical model we show, which variables affect the
exchange rate. At last we will show how changing exchange rate affects income statement of
gold farming company.
Organisation of a firm
Reason, why companies are created, is transaction costs (Coase 1937). Transaction costs are
relatively small in gold farming (Heeks 2008). This fact stems mainly from the use of the
Internet. It causes the cost of acquiring information is low and because of the nature of the
process it eliminates transaction costs of the contracts1 (Heeks 2010). The reason why the
companies specializing in gold-farming activities exist is more likely returns to scale (Heeks
1On the other hand Heeks(2008) states that there is another type of costs, which are connected with
reputation - gold farming is semi-illegal activity, thus there has to be trust between counterparties - neither
one party can go to a trial.
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2008). Many workers are needed for the effective acquisition of virtual goods plus some ac-
tivities require larger amount of players. Basic gold farming (in other words primitive killing
and selling) is against all expectations a simple mechanical activity that does not require any
qualifications or skills. On the other hand, advanced techniques (for example using in-game
auctions) have got some requirements on human capital. Workers are paid based on the re-
sults (Heeks 2008). Further, they need coordinators, who maintain the company in operation.
Therefore, there is a specific hierarchy in gold farming companies (Heeks 2008). Aside from
the workers there are managers, who lead the company plus people, who try to optimize gold
farming procedures (Heeks 2008).
Gold farming supply chain
In the text above the structure of a company was described. The following text deals with
the company’s place in the broader chain of other interest groups. Swaminathan, Smith and
Sadeth (1998) define supply chain as ”a network of autonomous or semiautonomous business
entities collectively responsible for procurement, manufacturing and distribution activities
associated with one or more families of related products”. In gold farming industry it has got
the following form according to Heeks (2008):
• IT suppliers provide technical aspect of the business.
• Gold farming companies produce virtual assets. They buy labor from their workers
and sell output to brokers, or directly to the customers.
• Retailers are the mediators, who convey final good to the customers. Virtual assets
retailers are either exchange servers (for example Swagvault) or virtual characters, which
demand it straight in the game. In the case of gold farming brokers mediate virtual
assets and are involved in the business directly, unlike the exchangers, who are not
engaging directly.
• Marketing element takes various forms. It can be in-game spammers, pursued by
operators, or fan servers, which are operated by the participants of RMT.
• End consumers are players of MMORPG, who use services of RMT providers.
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The advantage of this business is that thanks to the virtual nature of the goods, no costs
must be paid for transporting goods and their storage. Thus supply chain is simpler than in
other industries (Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist 2011).
In addition to these interest groups directly involved in RMT, there are other more or less pro-
nounced relationships to the business. At first there are players, who are not involved in RMT
(they were in model in chapter 2, hidden in n). Then government, whose attitude to RMT
varies from lack of interest to reluctance, and last but not least operators of the MMORPGs,
who indirectly co-create this business and whose influence is described in chapter 4.
3.2 Costs and revenues
Previous pages brought general information about the structure of gold farming company.
Now we examine it from the point of view of revenues and costs. Gold farming company is
a firm in microeconomic sense: it creates output (virtual currency) with help of inputs. For
the purpose of our analysis we will use only two outputs - labor and capital.
Labor and Capital
Definition 1 (Capital) Durable goods capable of producing a stream of goods or services
over a period of time. 2
In the case of gold farming following aspects can be embraced in capital. At first computers,
which are key production factor for gold farming. Minimal requirements given by game must
be satisfied or PC cannot be used. Another items are computer games - price depends on
a current game, on which company is specialized. The most common PC game involved in
capital is World of Warcraft3. Last but not least we have to mention human capital, or skills
and experiences of the workers. In this case it means ability to understand the nature of a
game (Heeks 2008). Second production factor is labor.
Definition 2 (Labor) A factor of production which consists of the effort and time of human
2definition from Rutherford D. Routledge Dictionary of Economics,3rd ed., Routledge,2005
3because WoW is the most popular MMORPG, as we wrote in the first chapter
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beings engaged in the production of goods or services. 4
For the purpose of gold farming we can consider mainly the earning of virtual assets - it is
provided by a mass of ordinary workers. It constitutes the majority of firm’s labor. Then
there are salaries of the managers and in some companies there are technical experts, who
take care of company’s computers (Heeks 2008).
Costs
In case of gold farming the cost of capital can refer to following items. At first it’s the price of
computers, which is permanently decreasing. Gold farmers can use overhauled computers too.
Luckily for them, MMORPGs have usually got low hardware requirements 5. Then there are
internet and electricity fees, which vary from country to country. In China internet fees are
relatively high 6 - until 2012 there was monopoly7. Then there are damages caused by deleted
accounts8 - that’s specific type of costs. Creating of new account (contrary to creating of
new virtual character) isn’t free plus gold farmers lost their gold, items and especially virtual
characters9. Cost of labor represents mainly wages of ordinary workers, which constitutes the
majority of costs of labor. As it was mentioned above, wages of ordinary Chinese gold farmers
are relatively small compared to Western standards (Heeks 2008).
Revenues
There are two stages, which are needed for earning money in gold farming industry. In the
first one gold farmer has to collect virtual currency. Second stage is about selling it for real
money. First stage depends on gold farmer’s abilities, whereas second stage is dependent
on the exchange rate, which we mentioned already in chapters 1 and 2. Hence at first we
briefly describe obtaining virtual assets and then we focus on change in exchange rate. The
following text describes main methods of obtaining virtual gold in MMORPG10. Let’s assume
4definition from Rutherford D. Routledge Dictionary of Economics,3rd ed., Routledge,2005
5for example World of Warcraft - http://www.xzone.cz/nahledgame.php3?idg=2528
6http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1102MainCatID=id=20120501000061
7http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/15/content_14843546.htm
8Deletion of player’s account is popular method of fighting against RMT, the method itself is discussed in
chapter 4
9as is written in World of Warcraft EULA
10For purpose of the thesis we deal with World of Warcraft gold farming based on personal experiences.
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for the purposes of our analysis that the player will sell items with maximum gain and thus
the only variable which we calculate are gold coins. Almost all enemy NPCs carry a certain
amount of either virtual money or tradable items (or both). From my experience there is a
positive correlation between a monster’s amount of gold and its toughness. Aside from the
gold some creatures have got items, which are special for their kind. An example could be a
monster called ”sand basilisk.” The basilisk is relatively tough to kill, in the game this fact is
represented by the 46th level11. On this basis, the player finds appropriate amount of money
- in my experience from two to five silver coins. In addition, however, lots of the basilisks
have got ”sand basilisk scale”, an item that no other species owns. Hence when we sell this
item we found, selling price of this item plus the silver coins mentioned earlier gives us a total
revenue for killing the basilisk. It should be noted that the yield of all the Basilisk lizards is
not the same. Other sources of wealth are quests12 given by NPCs. In World of Warcraft the
reward has always a form of virtual money, and often player can often choose from several
items. Popular method of acquiring gold is through crafting. Examples of the crafts in World
of Warcraft were given in chapter 1. Another possibility of earning gold is through selling
virtual items in Auction House, which was mentioned in chapter 1 too.
Second stage - sale of virtual currency - consists of arrange of a deal with buyer (passive
RMT user), delivering goods to customer and receiving payment from the customer. The
supply chain mentioned earlier affects it as well as the exchange rate.
3.3 Model of supply-demand chain in gold farming industry
Overview
Now we try to employ previous knowledge into an overall model of gold farming industry.
We assume a supply chain with three counterparties - gold farming company on supply side,
passive RMT user on demand side and between them mediator - exchange server, which is
known from beginning of this chapter. Let this chain have the following form.
11Level is indicator, which shows degree of virtual character’s power (avatar’s as well as NPC’s),see Appendix
12A quest is a task given to a player character that yields a reward when com-
pleted.(www.wowwiki.com/quest),see Glossary in Appendix
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Figure 3.1: Supply-demand model with mediator
Our task is to theoretically show how the exchange rate between virtual and real currency is
made. At first we describe all parts of this model.13
1. Gold farming company sends produced (collected) virtual goods to exchange server.
We denote this amount as Qs = S(P, F,A), where S is increasing in P (price of virtual
asset, which is paid to gold farming company by an exchange server) as well as it is
decreasing in F, which in this case denotes the price of production factors (which were
stated earlier). Variable A is proxy for inconvenience for gold farming in particular
MMORPG14. We assume that function is decreasing in A. The expedition costs F ·
S(P, F,A).
2. Exchange server sends amount of demanded virtual assets. We denote this amount as
Qd = D(ex, Y ). We presume that the demand is decreasing in the exchange rate and
increasing in Y (player’s real income, from previous model W + w · l). Player pays the
amount of money, which is equal to EX ·D(ex, Y ), where ex denotes the exchange rate
between virtual and real currency.
13In chapter 2 we operated with exchange rate between real and virtual currency(EX) - from the point of view
of buyer (player). On the other hand now we operate with exchange rate between virtual and real currency
(ex), which denotes amount of real currency, which gold farmer obtains for one unit of virtual currency, thus
ex = 1
EX
. From this chapter until the end of the thesis we follow this meaning of the exchange rate.
14In other words - how difficult is to run gold farming business in particular MMORPG.
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3. Gold farmer receives part of revenue from previous transaction, whis is equal to
P ·D(ex, Y ) = (1−τ)ex ·D(ex, Y ), where τ is provision of exchange server for arranging
the deal.
If we assume that supply is equal to demand, then we will obtain following system of equations.
Qs = S(P, F,A)
Qd = D(ex, Y )
Qd = Qs = Q
Πgf = P ·D(ex, Y )− F · S(P, F,A)
Πes = ex ·D(ex, Y )− P ·D(ex, Y ) = τ · ex ·D(ex, Y )
First two equations we mentioned above. The equation Qd = Qs expresses equilibrium, where
supply is equal to demand. Fourth equation and fifth equation denotes gold farmer’s profit
(respectively profit of exchange server). In this model we assume that the exchange rate is
set through relationship ex = P1−τ . Moreover, we assume that τ is set by exchange server. If
we substitute third equation into fourth one, we obtain
Πgf = (P − F ) ·Q
Another assumption is that F, A and Y are given exogenously. We will assume that P > F ,
otherwise company would not operate. Our task is to show relationship between P (EX re-
spectively) and other variables. Then their changes and shocks will be discussed.
Effect of cost of production factors and player’s income
If supply is equal to demand, then15
S(P, F,A)−D(ex, Y ) = 0
with previously mentioned relationship between price and exchange rate we obtain
Z = S(P, F,A)−D( P
1− τ
, Y ) = 0
15based on http://www.math.northwestern.edu/ clark/285/2006-07/handouts/implicit.pdf
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We can use implicit function theorem. In this case Zy denotes function Z differentiated with











SP −Dex · 11−τ
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> 0
Previous inequality holds because SP − DP · 11−τ > 0 and SF < 0, as we know from earlier











SP −Dex · 11−τ
)
> 0











SP −Dex · 11−τ
)
> 0
Our results say that if firm’s cost increases, then firm has to increase price of virtual currency
too. If income of the players increases, then gold farming company increases the price. Same
situation is with A, which will be examined in the last chapter.
Relationship between price and exchange rate
At the beginning of our analysis we assumed (and related literature justifies it - Heeks(2008)




From this equation it’s clear that increase of F,A or Y causes increase of the exchange rate.
Heeks (2008) cites Dibbel (2007) and Yee(2006), who state that mediators set τ = 47 %
(Dibbel), respectively 62 % (Yee). It’s clear that with an increase of price the exchange rate
rises too. At last we can see that vertical integration (acquisition of distribution channels) is
a good idea.
Changes in exchange rate
Until now we implicitly assumed that exchange rate is static. In chapter five we will show
that it isn’t true (we use data from exchange servers, which show dynamics of exchange
rate). But now we try to analyze reasons why price and thus exchange rate changes through
34
variables, which we choose as determinants of supply and demand. We don’t take inflation16
into account. At first we assume changes in customer’s income - positive or negative demand
shocks (the term W+w·l, known from chapter 2, increases or decreases). In case of production
factors as well as player’s income we can distinguish many reasons. When we study neoclassical
microeconomic theory, we realize that it concedes the possibility of increase of the price of
the production factors with entry of new firms into the industry17. If we focus on price of
production factors one more time, main concept of economic theory - scarcity - implies that if
some production factor diminishes, then its price increases18. If we look at gold farming supply
chain, we mentioned three parties, which affect gold farming and RMT. They are players, who
are not involved in RMT (their presence lowers utility of RMT users - from model in chapter
2), governments and especially operators of MMORPGs, whose majority is against RMT and
thus against gold farmers too. We will discuss their motives and measures in chapter 4. Now
we state following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Operator’s actions (at least some of them) affect the exchange rate.
We will deal with this hypothesis in chapter 5. Now we have to say that its core comes from
the previous model, where we added variable A, which is heavily affected by the operator
himself.
3.4 Income statements
In the previous section we discussed firm’s revenues and costs generally. Pages below provide
an estimate of income statement of an average gold farming company plus estimate of income
of a single gold farmer. The first one is from China (2006), the second one is from Czech
Republic (2012).
16Neither real world inflation, nor inflation, which takes place in virtual economies. For readers interested
in virtual inflation I recommend Skuhrovec (2009).
17Koubek I., Microeconomics - lecture notes, IES
18Samuelson, P., Nordhaus W., Ekonomie. 18th edition, Praha: Svoboda, 2007.
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Income statement in 2006
Following balance sheet estimated Zhe in 2006. It is based on gold farming company that
has got 10 employees plus one manager. The company is specialized on World of Warcraft.
According to Zhe (2006) it has got these properties:
Expenditure Items Expenditure ($) Income Items Income ($)
Worker wages 1 205 Gold sales 10 200
Food 360
Rent 360
US proxy server rental 300
Manager wages 180
Games subscription 150
Internet connection fees 145
Electricity 90
Total 2 790 Total 10 200
Profit 7 410
Source: Zhe (2006)
Following information comes from Zhe(2006). Workers labour 12 hours per day. Average
amount of gold coins per one employee is 200 g per 12 - hour working day, thus roughly 16, 7
g per hour19. Gold farming company sold them for 17 $ per 100 g. Heeks (2008) comments






= 3, 65 = 365%
It means that profitability is extremely high. However, owners of the company obviously share
this profit with mediators, as we wrote above.
19Note that these figures are from 2006, now it’s possible to earn more gold.
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Income statement 2 - Czech Republic
Now let’s try to replicate the income statement for Czech Republic in 2012. With estimation
of the costs I will use characteristics of my personal computer. Following costs will be in
Czech Crowns. Contrary to previous income statement we assume single gold farmer from
Czech Republic
At first there is an electricity fee, counted per kilowatthours. I measured that average electric-
ity consumption of the computer is 3 kwH per 24 hours20, while running on maximum. The
price of electricity is 4.6 per kwH. If we assume that month has got 30 days, then electricity
fee for running of computer is 30 · 4, 64 · 3 = 417,6. Now we discuss other two important
fees - internet connection fee and game (World of Warcraft) subscription fee. In my case
the first one is 350 per month. In Czech Republic World of Warcraft subscription fees are
around 300 per month21. Hence month costs per my computer are 417, 6+350+300 = 1067,7.
Now let’s look how big should productivity of virtual asset be. For simplicity let’s assume
that there are no transaction costs, the only virtual asset is currency (gold) and that exchange
servers buy gold at the same price they sell it (provision τ is zero). Now we use data22 to
determine this break-even revenues in longer period - from the beginning of 2009 to the end
of 2011. In graph below we see expected monthly costs known from the previous text ( but
now in dollar), which change with daily USD/CZK23 exchange rate.
20calculated with help of http://www.extreme.outervision.com/PSUEngine
21http://www.xzone.cz/nahledgame.php3?idg=1165
22from exchange server, we randomly chose realm (see glossary in Appendix) Aggramar
23data source: www.cnb.cz, expected montly costs denote how big are monthly (30 days) costs if both
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Figure 3.2: Costs of hypothetical czech gold farming company (2009 - 2012)
Now we look at expected monthly break-even revenues (in gold), which (as in the previous
case) depend on the USD/CZK exchange rate as well as exchange rate between virtual and




In words - cost(measured in dollar) in time t divided by exchange rate between virtual and
real currency in t.


















Figure 3.3: Break-even gold revenues (2009 - 2012)
The figure 3.3 above shows the necessary amount of gold, which is needed to collect per month
to cover the costs. As we can see, the necessary amount of gold, which we have to collect,
varies through the time - from 5000g to 35 000g.
Model with inflation
In previous model we didn’t take into account inflation in real world. But now we will
calculate with it. Let’s have (as in the previous text) single gold farmer, who has got simple
profit function in the following form
Π(t) = ex(t) · Pr(t)− C(t)
Let’s describe those variables - t denotes time, ex is exchange rate between virtual and real
currency(dynamic and exogenous, contrary to previous assumptions), Pr is productivity and
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C denotes costs25. Dynamic productivity means that player becomes better when he spends
more time in the game. Moreover, let’s assume that productivity function is concave, thus
the increments of productivity decrease. Contrary to this, we have no assumption about the
exchange rate development (except that the function is continuous) Now we employ constant
inflation π, which makes our costs dynamic too. Let’s assume that
∂C
∂t
= Ċ = π · C(t)





lnC(t)− (ln ex(t) + lnPr(t)) < 0







In words - inflation has to be lower than the percentual growth of player’s ability plus per-
centual growth (decline) of the exchange rate. But we assume that Pr(t) is concave and thus
the percentual increments of the player’s ability will be lower and lower. Thus if there are
no positive development in exchange rate (i.e. its increase), then gold farmer starts to have
a loss. Thus the exchange rate become more imporant through time for the single gold farmer.
The aim of this subsection was to show the impact of exchange rate on balance sheet. We
showed on data that necessary revenues(counted in gold) are heavily affected by the exchange
rate. Moreover, we showed that if we consider that costs are increased by inflation, then sin-
gle gold farmer becomes more and more dependent on this rate. Next chapter shows possible
source of its changes - operator of MMORPG.
25Problem is that the exchange rate is changing in real time,whereas gold farmer’s productivity increases
with time spending in MMORPG. Hence we will assume that in this case real time is proxy for in-game time.
26we assume that neither ex nor Pr are zero as well as C
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Chapter 4
Regulation of RMT: gold farmers
VS operators and governments
In chapter 2 we showed that the exchange rate between real and virtual currency is an im-
portant variable, which affects decision-making of the players. Now we try to identify one of
the main sources of (potential) disturbance of the variable - operator’s actions against gold
farmers. This chapter should answer three basic questions:
1. Why would a company wanted to fight RMT?
2. What methods are used for regulation?
3. How the governments approach RMT and gold farming?
In the second part of this chapter we focus on Blizzard - operator of World of Warcraft.
4.1 Regulation: theory and reality
As we wrote earlier, the majority of online game operators struggle against gold farming. In
this section we will show the reasons why. We will focus on the impact of gold farming on
operator’s profit. There is a big problem with data - it is almost impossible to identify the
amount of money, which operator lost because of the mentioned activity. However, we can
describe this problem with help of theoretical concept.
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Operator vs gold farmer - game theory approach
Game theory is a valuable tool for analyzing interaction between the subjects. Central part
of this chapter is dedicated to game theory based model, which describes interaction between
gold farmer and operator of a MMORPG. Aim of this analysis is to discover when it is
advantageous for the operator to provide RMT as well as pursuing gold farmer. At first we
look at the picture below, where is the game itself.
Figure 4.1: Operator VS gold farmer: whole game
As we can see, it is a combination of extensive and normal form of a game. In the first
step the operator decides whether he wants to provide RMT on his own, or not. If we say
”providing RMT by operator”, we mean that the operator offers players to buy virtual items
(or currency) for real money officially from him. We will assume that if the operator provides
RMT on his own, then his marginal cost is zero. This assumption is built on fact that the
operator runs MMORPG and he is able to add any item he wants through programming. One
of these decisions leads into another game, now in normal form and production decision. Our
analysis is divided to three main steps. At first we solve subgame, then production decision
and then with help of obtained results the whole game will be solved.
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FIRST STEP: Subgame 1 - Operator doesn’t provide RMT
At first we analyze the possibility that operator does not provide RMT. It will be made with
the help of a game in normal form.
Players
Gold farmer and operator of MMORPG.
Strategies
Gold farmer can run gold farming or not. Operator adjudicates if he fights it or not.
Payoffs
Let X be gold farming company’s income, C - cost of fighting against gold farming, βs is sen-
sitivity of ordinary players to operator’s inactivity toward gold farming (in other word proxy
variable for the amount of leaving disgusting players), p is the probability of the gold farmer
that he or she will be punished (if operator fights) and B denotes harshness of punishment
itself. At last F is subscription fee, which ordinary players pay for playing the MMORPG,
which the operator provides. In this model let’s assume that operator fights with gold farmer
only in cyberspace and thus the operator has no direct profit from harm. Moreover, all vari-
ables have to be higher than zero (or equal). It’s trivial in the cases of C,F,B. In the case of
p, we know that it is probability and thus it has to be between 0 and 1. A little bit more
complicated situation is with sensitivity. Negative value could be interpreted in terms of gold
farming attracting new players. Nevertheless, we will presume that this value is positive.
Payoffs are in matrix below.
Let’s describe these particular situations one by one. If gold farmer operates in MMORPG
and operator tries to fight it, then expected payoff of the gold farmer decreases because of
the probability of getting caught. Operator pays cost of fighting as well as in case that gold
farmer is not active. In this case gold farmer’s payoff is zero. If the gold farmer is active and
the operator isn’t, then the first mentioned of them obtains full income X, while the operator
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Figure 4.2: Operator VS gold farmer: subgame 1 - normal form
faces outflow of disgusted players from his game. Proxy for this outflow is sensitivity βs, total
loss is sensitivity times subscription fee. Now we try to solve the game. At first we recall
definition of Nash equilibrium
Definition 3 The strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate
from his strategy given that the other players do not deviate.1
Nash equilibrium is the easiest and the most intuitive solution of the game. There is no
general Nash equilibrium, which holds for all values. Nash equilibrium exists only in these
cases
1. If X > pB then strategy run RMT dominates don’t run RMT. Moreover, if C < βsF ,
then strategy (run GF, fight GF ) is Nash equilibrium.
2. If X > pB then strategy run RMT dominates don’t run RMT. Moreover, if C > βsF ,
then strategy (run GF, don’t fight GF ) is Nash equilibrium.
1RASMUSEN E., Games and information: an introduction to game theory. 4th ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell
Pub.; 2007. xxix, 528 p.
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3. If C > βsF then strategy don’t fight GF dominates fight RMT. Then strategy (run GF,
don’t fight GF ) is Nash equilibrium.
Thus we have to find the equilibrium in mixed strategies for case X < pB and C < βsF .
At first we express probabilities of particular actions. Let’s denote the probability of op-
erator’s fighting against gold farming with θ, thus probability of operator’s inactivity will
be 1 − θ. We will do it similarly with the probability of running gold farming operations
in MMORPGs. We denote it γ. It implies that opposite state will be 1 − γ. Let’s write
operator’s profit in following form2
Πoperator = θ(γ(−C) + (1− γ)(−C) + (1− θ)(γ · (−βsF ) + (1− γ) · 0)
If we differentiate it with respect to θ, we will obtain
∂Πoperator
∂θ
= γ(βsF )− C = 0




Previous equation says that probability of running gold farming is increasing in C and de-
creasing in βs and F. It can be interpreted in the way that gold farmer assumes that an
increase of costs discourages the operator from fighting. Contrary to this fact an increase of
F causes a decrease of operator’s potential profit. An increase of βs indicates that players
became more sensitive to manifestation of RMT, thus it’s more probable that operator will
fight
Now we will do a similar operation with gold farmer’s profit to find the probability of fighting
against gold farming.
Πgoldfarmer = θ(γ(X − pB) + (1− γ) · 0) + (1− θ)(γ ·X + (1− γ) · 0)
2Rasmusen,E., Games and information: an introduction to game theory, 4th ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell
Pub.; 2007. xxix, 528 p.
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If X increases, then the probability θ arises too. It can be interpreted that an increase of gold
farmer’s profit motivates gold farmer to higher activity, thus it’s better to fight him. Increase
of p and B, on the other hand, discourage gold farmer from providing this business and lower
probability θ that operator strike against gold farmer. Now we examine expected payoffs of
the gold farmer and the operator in mixed strategies3.
Πgoldfarmer = θ · (X − pB) + (1− θ) ·X = − X
pB
· pB +X = 0
Πoperator = γ · (−C) + (1− γ) · (−C) = −C
From previous equations we can see that Πoperator ≤ Πgoldfarmer in mixed equilibrium. At
the end of the analysis of this game we can deduce one conclusion. Let B and βs are given
exogenously. Moreover, C, F and p can be affected (or directly set) by the operator. Our
conclusion is that if X < pB and operator invents some anti-gold farming mechanism, which
decreases cost to C = 0, then the probability of running gold farming in operator’s MMORPG
is zero and thus gold farming will be wiped out.
SECOND STEP: Operator provides RMT
Second option means that the operator is involved in RMT directly. We can establish a
very simple model of the operator, who provides RMT. Let’s write profit from gold farming
prosecuted by its own operator in the form
Π = Πopmon − αs · F
3based on RASMUSEN E., Games and information: an introduction to game theory. 4th ed. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Pub.; 2007. xxix, 528 p.
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where Πopmon is profit function, which shows the operator’s profit from RMT, αs is sensitivity
of the players on RMT provided by the operator (similar to βs, but we can assume that
αs >> βs - the players are more disgusted by the official providing of RMT by the operator
than simple tolerating) and F denotes subscription fees of the particular MMORPG. Assume
that the operator is a monopolist in its own MMORPG without an ability to discriminate
customers. The assumption of the operator’s monopoly is based on the previous assumption
of zero marginal costs, thus he will force ordinary gold farmers out. Let demand for virtual
assets is characterized by a following function 4
Q(P ) = a− b · P




Moreover, let total cost function TC consists only from fixed cost, thus first derivation is equal









From the last equation it’s clear that the optimal quantity does not depend on the slope of












4for example Koubek, I., Microeconomics, lecture notes, IES
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With knowledge of Pm and Qm we derive operator’s profit from RMT
Πopmon = P
















With substitution to original equation we obtain







− FC − αs · F
THIRD STEP: The whole game - solution
We know the payoffs from both decisions, thus we are able to solve whole game. Rational
operator chooses the variant, which maximizes his total payoff. Thus
Total Payoff = max{Payoff from SUBGAME 1,Payoff from DECISION 2}
Generally we can say that operator’s payoff from subgame 1 is loss from gold farmer’s activity,
either caused by cost of fighting RMT (C) or by loss of disgusted players (βs ·F ). Let’s denote






− FC − αs · F > −Lgf
where Lgf is either C, or βs · F . In other words - operator will provide RMT in case that his
total profit from RMT is higher than zero plus in case that his loss from providing RMT will
be lower than loss caused gold farmer’s activity.
According to this model operators of online role playing games have good reasons to fight
RMT. Trade with virtual currency affects non-users of RMT too. As we wrote in chapter 1
there are people who have more real money than virtual wealth. Instead of gradual develop-
ment of their own virtual characters, they buy a virtual characters created by someone else.
Then they equip him with virtual items bought for real money, or directly in the current
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game for virtual money, which they own because of services of gold farmers. We can a ask
crucial question: why operators don´t start to trade with virtual assets on their own? The
profit goes to firms from the monthly fees (represented by F in our previous model). Such
behaviour could disgust part of other players, who would go to another operator and thus
stop paying. Crucial variables are αs and F. It’s probable that the first mentioned one is
exogenous and strongly depends on type of the players, which play operator’s MMORPG. If
the players are highly sensitive (in this case it means that operator’s profit from gold farming
will be lower than zero), then the activity of gold farmer brings loss to the operator, no matter
what he does. This situation is valid only for role-playing games such as World of Warcraft.
A different situation is in online games like Second Life and similar. The difference between
them is that these games are based on the need to buy items for real currency and thus RMT
is provided by the operator (Linden Lab)5. But MMORPG worlds are generally built on a
complex system of skills and attributes of player’s virtual characters. There is a competition
and rivalry between players. In chapter 2 we defined the Achievers and the Killers, whose
motivation is to be better than others. Moreover, we showed that there are moral costs,
which lower player’s individual utility from using RMT. Hence there can be group of players,
who cannot use RMT because moral costs and they have to see how other players use it and
become stronger because of it. This state causes their frustration and they leave MMORPG,
where RMT is provided by operator. Similar situation can occur when operator tolerates
RMT in his MMORPG.
4.2 Methods of regulation
Previous model implied that in particular case it’s better for game operators to pursuit gold
farming than to provide or ignore it. In this section we will discuss methods of fighting this
phenomenon. This section follows previous game, namely the variant, where the operator
doesn’t provide RMT (thus he didn’t wipe out gold farmers by his monopoly). Instead of it




In chapter 1 we wrote, that some operators forbid gold farming and RMT in EULA. When
player installs game, he has to confirm that he agrees with EULA. In table below there are
cases, in which operator sued gold farming company, because it broke EULA and he wants
to be compensated from this company. In this table we can see result of lawsuit between
operator (first is a name of operator, which sued gold farmer in his MMORPG6) and RMT
providers (second name in the table is a name of a company, which provided RMT in particular
MMORPG). We can see that all lawsuits, which we found, were won by operator7. So we
can deduce that the probability of winning the trial is high. However, there aren’t many
trials8. In chapter 2 we wrote that according to Heeks (2008) majority of gold farmers are
from China. Neither one trial from our table is with Chinese gold farming company. Probably
it’s impossible to sue Chinese gold farming company for American operator.
lawsuit victor
Blizzard vs MDY INDUSTRIES, LLC Blizzard
Hernandez (= player against RMT) vs IGE Hernandez
Blizzard vs Game Dollar LLC Blizzard
JaGeX vs rsbot JaGeX
Source See Bibliography (Lawsuits against RMT)
Deleting accounts and issuing patches
In the previous text we stated that lawsuits aren’t common method of fighting RMT. Now we
focus on two more frequently used methods. First commonly used retaliation against players
using the services of RMT is blocking their accounts. Blizzard monitors individual user ac-
counts. When it registers that player participates RMT, the account is recorded and deleted.
The mass account deletions take place several times per year. When the mass deletion begins,
then the accounts are liquidated in tens of thousands. For example - 67 000 accounts banned
in 2006, 114 000 (together with Warcraft III), user accounts deleted in 2007, 59,000 accounts
blocked a year later, 320,000 accounts (along with Warcraft III and Starcraft) disposed at the
6Blizzard is known to us from previous chapters, JaGeX provides MMORPG called Runescape.
7source: Bibliography (Lawsuits against RMT)
8At least we didn’t find them.
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beginning of 2010. 9 All virtual money, items and characters are removed from users.
Second popular method of fighting against RMT and gold farming is issuing patches10. They
are automatically downloaded and implemented into the user’s game, where they perform
their purposes. Here is an example of how the patch may help in the fight against RMT.
In 2007 the amount of in-game spam11 rose sharply to promote the gold farming services.
Blizzard released patch 2.1 immediately, which improved anti-spam protection. Hence spam-
ming(and possible propagation of RMT) became harder.12. In the next chapter we analyze
patch policy of the operator in detail.
Approach of the operators to RMT is slightly changing through time. Even Blizzard launched
a special kind of business with real money - for a certain fee, players may change the prop-
erties of their virtual characters 13. Moreover, they can buy certain items for real dollars.
From the point of the players it is obviously not such a serious interference in the relations
between players as in the case of classical RMT14. The question is: will Blizzard expand to
provide this type of services? Through time new possibilities were added, for example since
2011 players are able to buy unique mount15, but until 2012 RMT provided directly by the
operator wasn’t established in World of Warcraft. If we look at previous model, it implies
that majority of players is still against it16.
4.3 Governments and RMT
In the previous section we described the relationship between RMT and gold farming on one
side and operators on the other side. We described gold farming as a specific form of busi-
9see Bibliography(Ban of the accounts)
10Additional program proposed by MMORPG’s operator, which corrects errors in the game, alternatively
adds new content. Unlike expansion pack it is free.




14Because until now it’s limited - only small amount of items is allowed to buy for real money.
15http://wow.joystiq.com/2011/10/10/blizzard-introduces-tradable-guardian-cub-companion-pet-purch/
16Althrough it’s hard to verify it empirically.
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ness. It means that it could be taxable. Following pages bring short overview of taxation (or
possible taxation) of this activity. In Czech Republic there is no taxation of real money trade
or gold farming. But in some countries all over the world there are these attempts. We list
there some of the most important examples.
At first we focus on South Korea’s value added tax (VAT), was levied on RMT in 200717. But
we can say that RMT is controversial topic in South Korea. From 2007 to 2012 it was several
times prohibited and allowed again. Recently, in June 2012 South Korea again banned it and
related issues18.
As was mentioned earlier, China is the centre of gold farming. Controversies with this activity
and RMT generally were (and still are) also there. There was pursuing of QQ-coins - virtual
currency, which began to extrude Chinese official medium of exchange. QQ-coins were reverse
RMT - people bought real items for virtual currency. Thus using QQ-coins for buying real
items was banned and since 2009 this country began to pursue the using of virtual currency to
buying real properties (including real money) generally19. Situation with RMT was unclear
until Chinese government imposed 20 percent tax on selling virtual items and de facto legal-
ized it. 20 In 2009 one more new restriction was imposed on MMORPGs. Operators of these
games must include special software in their games, which prevents long gaming to players,
who are younger than 18 years 21. After three hours they are disconnected and must wait for
minimum another five hours because of time spent by playing MMORGPs (secondary effect
is that it reduces ability to obtain larger amount of virtual currency).
Since 2006 there are discussions about taxation of buying and selling virtual assets in USA.
These attempts became louder because of increasing popularity of the biggest online games -







cate’s congress this possibility was mentioned too22. Until 2012 no tax was imposed .
The last example is from Australia. Since the same year like in USA similar debates took
place in Australia. It was stated that trade with virtual assets can be taxed23. But until 2012
no arrangements were made to reach this goal.
It’s probable that goverments are able to fight RMT more harshly than the operators. It’s
main reason why we mention their attitude toward RMT and gold farming. Hence if the
government is afraid of RMT (if collected gold would be used for buying real items), then its
actions probably affects costs of production factors mentioned in chapter 3 - for example an







Updates and their impact
Fifth chapter brings empirical analysis of the exchange rate – the variable, which we examined
in chapter 2 and 3 with help of economic theory. The chapter itself is organized in following
way. At first we will make short review of literature, which deals with virtual economies from
empirical perspective. Before we start analysis itself, we establish simple model of updating,
which will be extension of model in chapter 3. Then we describe dataset, which we will use
in this chapter, describe employed econometric method and execute analysis itself.
In the preface we wrote that there are only few academical papers, which deal with vir-
tual economies. Now we have to state that situation with empirical papers, which focus on
virtual economies, RMT or gold farming is even worse. We can state Lehtiniemi (2008) and
Castronova et al. (2009), who examined macroeconomic indicators in virtual economies. More
important for us is the paper written by Skuhrovec (2009). He focused on the price level in
World of Warcraft economy and showed that it is influenced by EUR/CNY exchange rate as
well as patches, which operator provides.
5.1 Theory of updates
Now we will establish theoretical background to phenomenon of game updating. Let’s recall
major model in chapter 3. In this model we have established variable A, which denotes anti-
gold farming climate in particular MMORPG (not caused by other players, but by the game
itself). With implicit function theorem we showed that increase of A causes increases of the
54
exchange rate between virtual and real currencies. But we didn’t examine which factors affect
this variable. Before the start of our empirical analysis we try to propose simple model of
game updating. Let’s A be function of following variables1
A = A(b, s, c, )
where b is proxy for difficulty of using bots2 in the game, c is proxy for difficulty of
spamming and c denotes proxy for difficulty of obtaing gold via crafting (or other similar
activities). We can assume that the function is increasing in all three variables:
1. Bots are used by gold farmers for many activities (Heeks 2008).
2. More difficult spamming implies worse advertising3.
3. Crafts are popular among gold farmers, thus when operator makes some of them difficult,
it should imply worse obtaining gold4.











Aim of the operator is to increase all three components of A to make RMT harder. On
the other hand he is not all-knowing and he hasn’t to disgust other players by extraordinary
draconic measures. Hence it is possible that patch instead of increase of A makes its de-
crease. If dA > 0, then negative effect of ds, db, or dc prevails over potential positive effect
caused by the patch, it makes RMT harder and according to our model established in chapter
3 it causes that the exchange rate increases. If dA < 0, then opposite phenomenon takes place.
1We know that it’s big simplification of reality, because there are plenty of effects, but with the two of them
we will work in empirical analysis.
2Bots are simple program, which are (in case of gold farming) use for simple mechanical collecting virtual
currency.
3In-game spam is used by gold farmer, we have written it in chapter 3
4It’s clear that ordinary players use crafts too, but probably they have got other hobbies in the game too,
thus worsening of crafs damages gold farmers more.
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In following empirical section we will examine three important updates of the most popu-
lar MMORPG of all time – World of Warcraft. First two of them are the patches, which
contain important change of one of the parameters from equation mentioned above. The last
update isn’t ordinary patch, but the most recent expansion5 of World of Warcraft – Cataclysm
itself.
Before we start with analysis itself, we have to mention one important problem, which is
connected with updating. It’s difficult to predict the impacts of some measures on gold farm-
ing because in many cases they cannot be seen on first look. Good example is patch 4.0.1,
which antecedes Cataclysm. Before this patch, there were ore excavations in location called
Azshara. The patch caused that Azshara was ruined and the excavations were lost. It implied
increase of c, because this place was popular among gold farmers and their bots6. As we can
see, it’s hard to theoretically evaluate the impact of a patch. Hence we will analyze those
chosen patches, in which are significant and clear changes of one of the parameters mentioned
above7.
5.2 Empirical analysis
Data, which we will use, were collected from 24.02.2009. to 7.3.2012 in 27 realms8 from the
exchange servers9. The variables, which we will use, have got following meaning
• EXv denotes amount of US dollars, which exchange server obtains for 1000 gold.
• Patch is qualitative variable, which is 0 before particular update was released and 1
after the release.
5something like very big patch
6www.wowwiki.com/azshara
7We have to say that there are lots of patches in WoW.
8Realms are called the servers, where World of Warcraft runs. All realms contain the same world, buth
with separate population. Realms are divided according to WoW geography version. Our dataset contains US
realms (version for North and South America) and EU realms (version for Europe).
9Here I want to thanks to Jiri Skuhrovec for providing data.
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In each of following cases procedure will be be same. Because of the nature of our data
(time series + various realms) we use panel data econometric methods. Generally we will use
following econometric equation10
EXvi,t = α+ αi + βj
p∑
j=1
EXvi,t−j + γPatchi,t + δT + εi,t
In our case αi is dummy variable of particular realm, i denotes particular realm and t is mark
of time and T is time trend. We will use lags(autoregressive process AR(p)) of EXv too. All
graphs, which are concerned with this chapter, are in Appendix B.
Patch 3.3.5 and Cataclysm
Now we jointly focus on patch 3.3.5 and Cataclysm. Patch 3.3.5 was released on 22th June
2010 (on US realms) and one week later on EU realms11. We will analyze the patch because
it contains program Warden 2.0, which is against in-game cheating (which involves usage of
bots). Hence we formulate following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Warden 2.0 made (at least for some time) production of gold harder. It implied
increase of A, which was following with increase of the exchange rate between dollar and gold.
Cataclysm was released on 7th December 2010. Its predecessor was patch 4.0.1, which pre-
pared the virtual world on Cataclysm itself and which contained lots of changes (our previously
mentioned Azshara example included). Hence we will include patch 4.0.1 into our econometric
equation, but we will not interpret them. Now let’s return to Cataclysm itself. If we want to
predict his influence on the exchange rate, we have to go beyond model, which we established
in chapter 3. Reason is that Cataclysm is very specific, because it has got significant impact
on demand side of RMT - on productivity of all players. After its release players were allowed
to reach up to 85th level, instead of 80th level12 as before release. Hence higher level implies
higher productivity of ordinary players. We formulate following hypothesis:
10For this part of the thesis Baltagi(2002) was used as a guide.
11http://www.wowwiki.com/Patch_3.3.5
12In chapter 3 we noted that the term level denotes degree of virtual character’s power, thus they became
more powerful.
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Hypothesis 3 Cataclysm increased productivity of all players in World of Warcraft. It
implies that players harvest more gold and their need for RMT is lower and the exchange rate
is lower too.13
If we want to establish theoretical background for this hypothesis, we add productivity of
ordinary player (Pr) to demand function in supply-demand model in chapter 3 and we assume
that demand function is decreasing in productivity (because of the arguments mentioned
above). Thus
S(P, F,A)−D(ex, Y, Pr) = 0











SP −Dex · 11−τ
)
< 0
Thus increase of productivity of ordinary players decreases price of virtual currency and thus
the exchange rate decreases too.
We use data between 1.5.2010 and 23.12.2010. We employ AR(3) process14. Hence we use
following equation





i,t + γ3Cataclysmi,t + δT + εi,t
We used fixed effect estimator, because Hausmann test rejected hypothesis that random
effect estimator (GLS) is consistent. Let’s look on our results.
13Author of this hypothesis is Jiri Skuhrovec.
14because the trade-off between information criteria and significancy
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adjusted R2 number of observations
0,872061 5886
There isn’t significant time trend. On the other hand we can see that Cataclysm and Patch3.3.5
are significant as well as as Patch4.0.1. Coefficient of Patch3.3.5 is positive, thus the patch
increased the exchange rate and our hypothesis is proved. Coefficient of the dummy variable
Cataclysm is lower than zero. It implies that our hypothesis about Cataclysm holds.
Patch 3.3.5 and Cataclysm II - split of Cataclysm
In the previous text we showed that Cataclysm caused decrease of the exchange rate. But if
we look at the movement of the exchange rate immediately after the release15, we see that
series sharply rose and then sharply fell. Hence we run fixed effect estimator once more in
similar form with only one difference - we split Cataclysm into two dummy variables. The
first of them - Cataclysm2d - is 1 two days after Cataclysm was released, otherwise it is 0.
Second dummy variable - Cataclysm-rest - is 1 after release of Cataclysm minus two previously
mentioned days, 0 otherwise.
15In Appendix
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adjusted R2 number of observations
0,877712 5886
As we can see,Cataclysm2d is positive and statistically significant, thus we are allowed to say
that immediately after its release Cataclysm caused increase of the exchange rate, but then
the exchange rate fell under initial level. It’s hard to interpret this jump. Maybe possible
explanation is that part of gold farming companies had technical difficulties with launching
Cataclysm and it caused temporary supply shock.
Patch 4.2.0
We chose patch 4.2.0, because it negatively affects skinning16 - the method of obtaining gold,
which is heavily used by gold farmers. It was released on 28th June 2011.
Hypothesis 4 Worse skinning made (at least for some time) production of gold harder. It
implied increase of A, which was following with increase of the exchange rate between dollar
and gold.
16Skinning is a profession, we have written about professions in chapter 1,
http://www.wowwiki.com/Patch_4.2.0
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We used observation from 45 days before the patch was released and 46 days after the patch
was released. Again, we use fixed effect estimator because of the same reason as in the previous
case. Let’s look at our results. The results are following18:









adjusted R2 number of observations
0,664308 2403
Adjusted R2 is around 66 %. It indicates that the model is good. The results says that
contrary to the previous case there is significant decreasing time trend. Moreover, Patch4.2.0
is significant and positive, which implies that patch 4.2.0 increases the exchange rate and our
hypothesis is proved - patch 4.2.0 increased the exchange rate.
Generally, we can say that all updates, which we examined, affected the exchange rate19.
17again, based on the trade-off criteria and significancy
18Gretl was used.




Aim of this thesis was to describe trading with virtual assets in virtual economies from both
perspectives – from point of view of a buyer (player) as well as from point of view of gold
farmer himself - with respect to the exchange rate between virtual and real currency. In the
microeconomic model with help of implicit function theorem we showed that this exchange
rate affects player’s time and allocation decision as well as it has got impact on his decision to
become a gold farmer. Moreover, there are stated reasons why gold farmers establish compa-
nies, especially in China. Then we described firm’s organization, its production factors, their
costs as well as firm’s revenues. With simple supply-demand model of gold farming supply
chain we showed that in-game conditions for gold farming (A) affects already mentioned ex-
change rate – with increase of A exchange rate increases too. Then we stated our hypothesis
that one of the sources of its disturbances is operator of MMORPG, which is against RMT
and gold farming. With help of game theory model we showed conditions, which are necessary
for providing RMT by operator himself – profit from running RMT has to be higher than
zero, or loss from RMT providing has to be lower than loss caused by gold farmer’s activity.
Various sources imply that these conditions are not satisfied, because of ordinary players, who
are against providing RMT as well as its tolerating. The operators do not provide RMT, but
pursuit gold farmers and use various tools, which are described in the thesis too, especially
deleting their accounts and issuing patches. This follows last chapter of the thesis, which
tries to discover if second mentioned actions affect the exchange rate. We established simple
model of game’s upgrading, where variable A is a function of several factors, which are im-
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portant (not only) for gold farmers. We extended our supply-demand model from chapter 3
and proposed several in-game changes, which can harm (or benefit) gold farmers. Then we
chose the updates in World of Warcraft, which brough these changes. We used panel data
econometric methods to examine impact of these updates on the exchange rate. We realized
that both patches as well as Cataclysm react according to our assumptions. If we write about
updates, we have to mention that in 2012 new World of Warcraft’s expansion pack – Mists of
Pandaria – will be released by Blizzard an it will be interesting to examine how it affects the
exchange rate (if Cataclysm hypothesis will hold in this case too). Impact of the updates are
statistically significant and thus we can say that (at least in World of Warcraft) operator’s
actions have got influence on the exchange rate.
At the end of the thesis we have to state one important question. RMT and gold farming
itself are controversial phenomena, which – directly or indirectly – affect millions of people.
And it has got potential to affect them positively. If we recall chapters 1 and 2, where we
wrote that according Heeks (2008) findings working in gold farming industry is better for
unskilled laborers in developing countries than in some of other industries, we can ask a ques-
tion: can gold farming improves life of more people in developing countries? The answer on
this question is not simple. We have to become aware of fact that gold farming is semi-illegal
activity from the point of view of law and completely illegal activity from the point of view
of EULA. Anyhow, if we take into account this question as well as reasons stated in chapter
1, research of gold farming (and virtual economies overall) is a broad and promising field
of economics, where are lots of opportunities for theoretical and empirical economists also
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1. Account (WoW) Account in WoW contains all player’s virtual characters and thus
all his virtual property. Player pays subscription fee per account, probably majority
of ordinary players have only one account. On the other hand, on the account there
can be as much virtual characters as player wants.
2. Add-On Unofficial modification of a game, which brings new possibilities to it. Key
add-on for research of World of Warcraft is Auctioneer.
3. Alliance One of the two fractions in the World of Warcraft.
4. Avatar Another term for player’s ingame character, frequently used especially in
older literature, in our thesis we use rather the term virtual (or in-game) character.
5. Ban (of Account) Utmost measure of operator against player, who violates licence
agreement (EULA). Player’s account is deleted with all virtual items and characters
(without compensation).
6. Cheating Doing some immoral or unethical thing with or in the game (definition
from http://www.wowwiki.com/Cheating).
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7. Expansion Pack Official massive additional content, which is distributed by game’s
operator.
8. EULA End User Licence Agreement is an agreement, which describes relationship
between the operator and players.
9. Gold Currency in several MMORPGs, synonym for virtual currency generally.
10. Gold Farming Professional collecting and selling virtual assets, especially currency.
11. Horde One of the two fractions in the World of Warcraft.
12. Level Indicator, which shows degree of virtual character’s power.
13. MMORPGs Acronym for Massive Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games, genre
of online games, which put stress on development of in-game characters.
14. NPC Acronym for non-player character, i.e. characted controlled by artificial
intelligence.
15. Operator (of MMORPG) Firm, which is responsible for running of a MMORPG
and which owns all rights connected with the game.
16. Patch Additional program proposed by MMORPG’s creator, which corrects errors
in the game, alternatively adds new content. Unlike expansion pack it is free.
17. Power-levelling A player pays another player to play with his virtual character, it’s
against EULA.
71
18. Quest Task given to a player character that yields a reward when com-
pleted(definition from www.wowwiki.com/quest).
19. RMT Acronym for Real Money Trade, which can be defined as use virtual assets
to earn real money, or use real currency to obtain ingame assets (money, items,
characters,...)
20. Realm Realms are called the servers, where World of Warcraft runs. All realms
contain the same world. There are lots of realms, because of danger of overpopula-
tion. Some realms are special for certain type of the players, for example realms for
role-players, which mentioned in chapter 2. Realms are divided according to WoW
geography version. Our dataset contains US realms (version for North and South
America) and EU realms (version for Europe).
21. Spam/spamming (in WoW) Sending an overly repeated message or large useless
quantity of text in a Chat channel (definition from http://www.wowwiki.com/Spam).
It can be used for propagation of gold farmers too.
22. World of Warcraft (WoW) The most popular MMORPG.
72
Appendix B
Chapter 5 - graphs and tables









































Figure B.1: Exchange rate - patch 4.2.0










































Figure B.2: Exchange rate - patch 3.3.5 and Cataclysm
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Figure B.5: Exchange rate - Cataclysm
B.3 Table - Criteria
Information Criteria
Model Akaike BS HQ
patch 3.3.5 & Cataclysm I 2263,874 2484,325 2340,504
patch 3.3.5 & Cataclysm II 1998,980 2226,111 2077,932




Theorem C.0.1 (Cramer rule)1
Let A ∈ M(n×n) be regular matrix, B ∈ M(n× 1) , B ∈ M(n× 1) and Ax=b. Then
xj =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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for j = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem C.0.2 (Silvester’s theorem )
Let A = aij, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n,A ∈ M(n × n) be symmetric. Matrix A is
negative semidefinite iff for every k = 1, . . . , n holds








an,1 . . . an,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
Theorem C.0.3 (Second order necessary conditions)
Let G ∈ Gn is nonempty and closed set, f ∈ C2(G) and a ∈ G. If f(a) is local
maximum, then Hessian is negative semidefinite.
Theorem C.0.4 (Implicit function theorem) If F (x, y) ∈ Ck in a set D (i.e. F is k
times continuously differentiable at any point in D) and (x0, y0) is an interior point
of D, F (x0, y0) = c = const and F ′(x0, y0) isn’t zero, then the equation F (x, y) = c,
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